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Fifteen years ago, Milton Friedman proposed supplementing the
public schools with a system of state-subsidized private education.' The
government's financial contribution would be made directly to parents
in the form of tuition vouchers valid for a fixed dollar payment toward
each child's education. Vouchers would be tenable at any public or
private school, including profit-making and church-operated institu-
tions, that met minimum state accreditation standards. Parents would
be free to supplement the voucher, if they wished. Schools, in turn,
could accept or reject whomever they pleased. Public-operated schools
would no longer receive tax support, but would have to rely on
voucher payments or supplementary tuition for financing. In this way,
Friedman claimed, parents could choose the kind of schooling they
desired without having to pay the penalty of sacrificed taxes. Not
merely voucher-supported private schools, but public schools as well
would become increasingly responsive to parents' wishes as they vied
for clientele. For the first time, schools would have a clear financial
incentive to provide better education. Innovations in curriculum,
staffing, and the physical and psychic environment of schools could
follow quickly upon consumer demand, rather than await the approval
of the sluggish school bureaucracy or the conservative general elec-
torate.
For most of the period since Friedman wrote, private schooling,
voucher plans and "freedom of choice" have been before the public
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more as Confederate maneuvers than libertarian reforms. But in recent
years things have changed. Black support for community schools,
liberal disenchantment with public education and increased political
pressure to modify church-state educational relations2 has given the
voucher plan a new constituency. In its latest form, it comes proposed
by Christopher Jencks and his associates at the Center for the Study of
Public Policy, in a Report supported by a planning grant from the
Office of Economic Opportunity. This effort goes further than its pre-
decessors in that it is designed to translate the voucher philosophy
into a detailed program of action. O.E.O. is now considering a three-
year, $15 million experiment to introduce vouchers in several large city
school systems.
Alternative Voucher Plans
The experimental voucher plan which O.E.O. would be prepared to
finance differs substantially from Friedman's free-market model. The
Office's intentions are set forth in the Report recently commissioned
from the Center. The Report proposes a plan which significantly
fetters free choice in the use of the voucher for the purpose of pro-
moting racial integration and educational equality among income
groups. Before arriving at its proposal, the Report undertakes a careful
and systematic analysis of alternative plans.
At the outset the Report examines Friedman's unregulated market
plan and rejects it for reasons that apply in some degree to the other
discarded alternatives as well. The difficulty with the Friedman plan
lies in its potential for economic and racial segregation and for
eventual reduction in the level of tax support for the education of the
poor. If every parent were given a fixed sum voucher to use as he
pleased, the Center concludes, large numbers of middle and upper-
2. Voucher aid to parochial schools both raises novel constitutional questions and
may help solve some old ones. Aid distributed in the form of direct payments to parents
poses fewer dangers of church-state entanglement than currently advocated alternatives,
such as payment to parochial schools for "secular services." Indeed, voucher aid may rep.
resent a more sensitive accommodation of the conflicting claims of the establishment and
free exercise clauses than does the present system of monopoly secular education. S'
McCann & Areen, Race, Religion, and The Super Board: Law and Education Vouchers,
TEACHERS COLLEGE REcoRD (forthcoming, Feb. 1971); Brief for the Center of Lw and Ed-
ucation as Amicus Curiae, Robinson v. DiCenso, appeal docketed, Nos. 569, 570, 39 U.S.L.W.
3110 (U.S. Sept. 22, 1970). In addition, use of vouchers to avoid desegregation dcclslons
has been the subject of extensive litigation; see e.g., Coffey v. Sate Educ. Fin. Comm'n,
296 F. Supp. 1389 (S.D. Miss. 1969); Brown v. South Carolina State Bd. of Educ., 296 F.
Supp. 199 (D. S.C.), aff'd. per curiam, 393 U.S. 222 (1968), and other cases cited in CaENTrr
FOR THE STUDY OF PUBLIC POLICY, EDUCATION VOUCHERS: A PRELIMINARY REPORT ON FINANC-
ING EDUC-ATION BY PAYMENTS TO PAR.NTs (1970) [hereinafter cited as REPORT] p. 163. The
Report contains appendices analyzing both the church-state and racial constitutional
issues raised by the use of vouchers, pp. '131-96.
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middle class children would be sent to exclusive private schools which
charged tuition beyond the level of the voucher. White children of
all classes might be packed off to segregated academies, and public
schools would become involuntary repositories for the poor, the black
and the educationally disadvantaged. Soon, the Report argues, an
electoral majority would realize that its self-interest lay in minimizing
the value of the voucher, thereby saving more in taxes than it would
pay in extra tuition. The result would be a system of primary and
secondary education which resembled American higher education in
its elitism, regressive finance, and indifference to the needs of the poor.3
The next plan the Report considers is the unregulated compensa-
tory voucher plan. It would provide supplementary allotments to poor
children to redress their market disadvantage, but would not place a
limit on the tuition that might be charged by schools participating in
the voucher plan. If the compensatory payment were high enough, the
poor could buy their way into economically integrated schools. But,
the Report argues, it is unrealistic to think that the poor will receive
such favorable terms for any length of time. "If education is sold on the
open market, like housing or food, legislators are likely to take their
usual attitude toward subsidizing the poor. Low-income families may
be given somewhat larger vouchers than middle-income families, but
the difference is unlikely to be as large as the difference in private
purchasing power between [the two groups]." 4 Thus, the compensatory
features would have little effect, and education would become almost
as stratified as it would be under an unregulated market.
In the compulsory private scholarship model, schools could charge
whatever tuition they wished so long as no applicant's family had to pay
more than it could afford. A formula set by the government would
determine maximum tuition for different income groups. The results
of this plan, the Report concludes, would be to give the voucher school
a strong incentive to drive the poor from its doors either by rejecting
their applications outright or, if that were prohibited, by adopting a
curriculum designed to repel students from poor and minority back-
grounds.5 Giving classes in French is an extreme but indicative ex-
ample of the possibilities for evasion.
The most elaborate scheme considered by the Report is the effort
voucher, first developed by John Coons and his associates. 6 Its purpose
8. REOir, pp. 26-31.
4. Id., p. 33.
5. Id., p. 36.
6. J. CooNs, V. CLuNE & S. SuGAmrAN, PmuTA WEALs AND Punuc EoucAnON (1970).
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is to reward parents who are willing to make extra educational ex-
penditures for their children, and at the same time make more ex-
pensive educations available to all. Voucher schools would be allowed
to function at any of a number of specified levels of annual per-pupil
expenditure. The size of an individual's effort voucher would increase
with the cost of his school and decrease with the size of his family's
income. The net result could be, for example, that a poor family
willing to pay an extra $50 for education might receive the same sup-
plemental payment as a well-to-do family paying an extra 500, With
an effort formula sufficiently responsive to income differentials a sys-
tem could be designed in which there would be no correlation be-
tween school expenditures and family income. In Coons' plan, equality
of family financial power would be assured through restrictions
against outside finance for voucher schools and prohibitions against
discretionary selection of applicants.
The Report's objection to the effort voucher is that it gives exag-
gerated weight to the willingness of parents to sacrifice for their chi-
dren's education, and thus aggravates existing inequalities among
children.7 In addition, the Report's underlying political assumptions
suggest skepticism about the future prospects of the effort voucher.
Under a rigorous application of Goons' scheme, some poor children
might be going to schools much more expensive than those attended by
children of affluent but stingy parents. But if the middle class behaves
according to the Report's predictions, it would not long abide a tax-
payer-financed reversal of the community's status structure.
The above plans, involving varying elements of voucher size, regu-
lated admissions, and compensatory payments, are set out for com-
parison in the table on the following page. In addition to the plans
already discussed, the table includes two other alternatives: the regulated
compensatory plan put forward by the Report, and a community effort
voucher favored by the authors of this review.
An Evaluation of the Report's Proposed Plan
As we have suggested already, the Report concludes that only a
highly regulated plan with a significant orientation toward compensa-
tory education could achieve its goals. Its proposal, suitably entitled
a regulated compensatory plan, has three important distinguishing
features.
7. REPoRT, p. 89.
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1. No school is allowed to charge students tuition above the amount
of the voucher.
2. Participating schools with more places than applicants would
have to enroll all applicants. Schools with more applicants than places
could accept a portion of their voucher students, say half, by their own
criteria so long as the remainder were chosen "in such a way as not to
discriminate against ethnic minorities."8
3. Extra money would be given to schools that enroll poor children.
In effect, poor children are given a supplementary voucher amount.0
The strictures the Report would place on the voucher plan would
significantly weaken its market orientation. But more importantly,
they would be administratively unworkable, and perhaps even self-de-
8. Id., p. 15.
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feating. If the middle class wishes to mingle only with its own, or if
schools find it far more profitable to accept some students rather
than others, a wide selection of evasions is easily at hand. Schools could
institute tracking systems or curricula specifically designed to repel
the poor or hard-to-educate. Though blacks who were still eager to
attend integrated schools could not be kept out, lower class whites
could be systematically excluded from that portion of the student body
selected by the school's own criteria. Even if evasionary middle class
tactics could be neutralized and open access guaranteed, substantial
geographical separation and intergroup antagonism could prevent in
many areas any substantial integration along class or racial lines.
The ban on tuition supplements could also be subverted. Schools
could be run as subsidiaries of larger organizations, such as churches or
clubs. Resource shuffling within such organizations could easily support
a school that could not pay its way on vouchers alone. Voucher money
could be directed to provide a limited educational program, with en-
richment aspects-music, art, recreation, foreign languages-provided
outside the school on a fee basis. In order to prevent parents from sub-
sidizing a school in return for preference in the discretionary admissions
process, the voucher agency would have to start policing schools' cur-
ricula and finances in minute detail. Schools would have to be forbidden
from consistently losing money-an easy enough burden for commercial
ventures, but probably fatal to innovative nonprofit schools. Capital
expenditures of any sort would have to be screened to make sure they
were not in fact covert subsidies. Guarding against evasions such as
these could turn the voucher agency into an anti-middle class version of
county welfare, destined quickly to lose any substantial political base.
Why should the Center propose a plan that is vulnerable to these
objections? Its choice can best be understood in the context of the
political and educational postulates underlying the Report.
The Report proceeds from the political premise that integrated
egalitarian education is not a popular cause and would rarely be
adopted as an explicit program. An implication of this view is that it is
only the institution of the public school that constrains the electorate
to allow even the current modest degree of resource equalization in
education. Legislators do not vote funds for the education of the
poor because they affirmatively believe in income redistribution, but
rather because the same schools, or at least the same school systems,
serve the middle class and the poor alike. Where schools are segregated
by economic class, as between central cities and affluent suburbs, even
rough resource equality breaks down. The lesson is that without the
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constraint imposed by universal public education, the political system
would produce no more equality in elementary and secondary educa-
tion than it does in any other area of economic life. If the credo of
free public education is supplanted by an ideology of unrestricted
private choice, according to this reasoning, lower income groups will
fare no better in kindergarten admissions than they now do in college.
The task, then, is to develop an egalitarian voucher plan which can
fall heir to the ideology of the public school. The terms of a voucher
experiment should be designed not merely to provide equal access and
resources by its own terms, but also to serve as a model for future uses
of the voucher mechanism. While the Report does not discuss the
question, its assumptions would justify a refusal to experiment with
any plan other than the single most restrictive and ideologically
coherent alternative. Otherwise, the political pressure to loosen restric-
tions on the use of vouchers would soon prove irresistible.
The Report's educational premises also counsel a highly regulated
plan. Relative resource expenditures on education, in its view, are
more significant than absolute levels in determining the quality of
education given to different economic groups. As long as poor children
go to relatively impecunious schools, they will be instructed by inferior
teachers, admitted to inferior post-secondary schools, and shunted into
inferior jobs. Moreover, even parity of financial resources would not
yield equality if schools are segregated by income class. The absence of
middle-income classmates may deprive poor children of the most effec-
tive purveyors of the common culture. Indeed, the Coleman Report
found that economic integration was the only measurable aspect of
school differences that seemed to affect children's educational achieve-
ment.10
The Report's conclusion is that a voucher plan must offer equality
of resources and access, rather than simply making more resources
available to all. The Report does not consider a plan which would
freely allow tuition supplements while siphoning off part of the
money for scholarships or compensatory vouchers, presumably because
it would suffer the same fundamental vices as the unregulated market.
We think that the Report is unduly pessimistic in its assumptions
and overly constrained in its conclusions. To begin with, it seems un-
likely that whatever modest equalizing features currently exist in
public education survive only through camouflage. State and local
10. J. CoLi Au Er AL., EQuALrrY OF EDUCATIONAL OPPORTUNIrY (1966).
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taxation is often regressive across a substantial middle range of in-
comes, and school expenditures are commonly biased toward higher
income groups. Thus there is no need to attribute the current system
of school finance to aberrational neglect of self-interest on the part of
the ruling classes. Public education is not such a bad deal for the top
half of the income distribution. However, even if the affluent were
suffering financially, and had no objectives beyond narrow class inter-
est, they might still provide public funds for education in order to pre-
clude the formation of an undereducated and underemployed lower
class. Even the most amateur sociologist must recognize that the wel-
fare and safety of the rich can be improved by judicious concessions to
the poor. In sum, a middle class bent on destroying the voucher system
through lower taxes would long ago have voted the public schools into
financial oblivion.
If we assume, however, a political situation as bleak as the Report
hypothesizes, then its voucher plan would never stand a chance of
adoption. It would require an army of reconstruction to impose
egalitarian vouchers and random selection on a populace hell-bent for
class (or race) segregation. For areas of the country which fit this de-
scription, the answer will have to be continued intervention by federal
courts or funding agencies. But if the whole nation were this way,
there would be no remaining constituency for regulation and no hope
for its enforcement. The Report's voucher proposal would resemble
the plan for world government presented to Frederick the Great, "a
capital notion, lacking only the assent of the crowned heads of Europe
for its adoption."
We also think that the Report errs in not considering plans which
would allow the affluent to supplement the voucher but would use
part of these additional funds for the education of the poor. The net
effect of such plans would be to increase the absolute level of spending
for the poor but worsen relative expenditures. Contrary to the Re-
port's assumptions, we do not think that relative expenditures are all
that count. Increased absolute spending for education need not merely
reshuffle the existing corps of teachers from one school system to
another. It could significantly bolster the numbers and improve the
quality of those in the teaching profession. Already, generational
changes and higher budgets have begun to reverse the post-war status
slump of public school teaching. New resources could only accelerate
that trend.
Notwithstanding our disagreements with the Report, we share its
reluctance to propose an unfettered market plan for widespread adop-
458
Vol. 80: 451, 1970
Reviews
tion. A free market in education would indeed provide little com-
fort for the poor. If the nation were on the verge of scrapping the
public school for a voucher system, there would be more to recom-
mend the Center's ball-and-chain approach. But the day of the voucher
is not yet at hand. The very notion of competition in education stirs
anguish in the hearts of public school theocrats and some conservative
teachers' organizations. Teachers' unions are fearful that a proliferation
of voucher schools might threaten their recent collective bargaining
successes or weaken the institution of tenure. The voucher plan, if it
gets tried at all, will for many years to come remain a limited experi-
ment.
Even if vouchers did catch on in the near future, we do not see how
restrictions imposed today will confine the range of anti-egalitarian
choice perceived tomorrow. There is no way to patent a single voucher
plan and deny the use of other plans to the evil-hearted. Thus we
would urge O.E.O. to experiment with a wide variety of voucher
schemes, including variants which might be unacceptable if proposed
as a comprehensive alternative to the public school.
Virtues of a Voucher Experiment
If the political prospects for vouchers are so limited, what good can
come from an experiment? We see at least four significant boons.
First, a voucher trial would finance some experimental schools and
curricula which otherwise could not get started. Despite the current
bull market in proposals for educational reform, actual accomplish-
ments are scarcely in evidence. Public schools remain allergic to
change, and private schools are inhibited by lack of a financial base or
a promising financial future. In these circumstances, even a small-
scale voucher plan might greatly improve the prospects for innovation.
Suppose, at the worst, that any new private schools started with
voucher money would serve only the children of the middle class. The
techniques they pioneered might nonetheless influence the entire
spectrum of public education, helping the poor through a kind of
ideological trickle-down, perhaps no less reliable than the prospects for
major financial equalization.
Second, a voucher experiment would highlight and help to over-
come the unequal distribution of educational resources among dif-
ferent communities. Although everyone probably knows that more is
spent for the education of the children of Scarsdale than for those of
Bedford-Stuyvesant, the actual statistics never come to the fore. But if
(to take an arbitrary numerical example) one community issued $1500
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vouchers while the other had to make do with $700, some state or
federal pressure for parity might ensue. The plan adopted could also
serve as a possible tool for accomplishing some measure of equaliza-
tion. Indeed, if a substantial degree of cross-community equality is
ever to be achieved, there will probably have to be greater financial
support than at present from state or federal governments. A voucher
plan would provide a convenient, non-interfering model for such
contributions.
Third, use of vouchers would increase the overall level of expendi-
tures for primary and secondary education in the participating com-
munities. Not all analysts would regard an increase in educational
expenditures as a benefit. There are many counterbalancing forces
which create biases for over- and underexpenditures. Let us mention
but two that create a downward bias, particularly for the education of
the poor. First, due to the mobility of individuals, a community de-
rives little of the benefit of educating its young. Second, providing
high quality education for the poor might act as a magnet, increasing
the tax burden in those communities which accept their social re-
sponsibility. A voucher plan which attracts non-local financing, and
makes use of the willingness of middle class parents to spend more on
education in order to provide additional funds for those less wealthy,
could provide a practical vehicle for increased expenditure.
Finally, vouchers could prove their worth as a means of depoliticiz-
ing education while increasing parental control. In the present context
of the monopoly public school, "community control" can often be
achieved only through bruising political fights among different ele-
ments of the community or between community groups and teachers'
organizations. A more market-oriented system could provide a less
antagonistic mechanism for insuring school responsiveness.
Again, these arguments would have to be qualified if vouchers were
proposed as a universal solution. Parental control of all schools might
frustrate important public objectives, such as allowing children to
learn from the thinking of diverse social groups. The powerful forces
pushing toward economic stratification might frustrate the equalizing
aspects of the voucher. But in today's world of monolithic schools and
unacknowledged resource discrimination, we see little risk in a wide-
ranging voucher experiment.
Specifically, we would urge that any voucher plan not be expected
to shoulder the entire burden of equalizing educational resources.
Rather, the state or federal agency funding the voucher should adopt
separate measures to ensure resource equality, such as the new -. E.W.
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guidelines for communities accepting Title I funds." The voucher plan
would then be made available only to districts in full compliance with
these regulations. It would be structured to reward community efforl;
other things equal, the level of state or federal support would be greater
for poor communities than for rich ones, and greater for communities
that spend more on education than for ones which spend less."- A
variety of plans should be tested. In some of them, schools should be
able to accept applicants according to their own criteria, subject to a
requirement that acceptances be in racial proportion to applications. If
excess tuition were charged, some portion might be recycled into the
basic voucher fund to provide scholarships for tuition schools. In that
way, parents could satisfy their desire for better schools for their own
children while being required to make those same opportunities avail-
able to the children of the economically less fortunate. A plan such as
this would, we feel, give vouchers a fighting chance without prejudice to
the future of publicly supported education.
11. See New York Times, September 27, 1970, at 47, col. 1.
12. This proposal, a generalization of the Coons effort voucher, was developed by Coons
and associates in J. CooNs, W. CLuNE & S. SuGAPMtAN, supra note 6.
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